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Anonymity and the Supreme Court’s Model of Expression:
How Should Anonymity be Analysed Under Section 2(b) of
the Charter? 
by Peter Carmichael Keen†
anonymity has been demonstrated in a number of courtIntroduction 
cases, in the context of adoption, where biological par-
ents may wish to remain anonymous, 4 by witnesses whononymity can be vital to free expression. History is
wish to remain anonymous, 5 and by parties to casesA replete with examples of individuals who expressed
involving abortion. 6their viewpoints and faced ridicule, threats, torture or
death as a result. Early Christians, and many religious The existence of laws that will have an impact on
groups since, had to practice their beliefs in secret, as anonymity is another reason to believe that claims will
they faced persecution for publicly expressing their be made that anonymity is constitutionally protected.
views. People are likely to remain silent if they will be One example is the section 163.1 Criminal Code prohi-
harmed for speaking out. Anonymity encourages free bition on possession and distribution of child pornog-
expression because it allows ideas to be publicly dissemi- raphy. Courts have already dealt with child pornography
nated while shielding the speaker from the reactions of prosecutions where the offending material has been dis-
those threatened by the ideas. tributed over the Internet. 7 The federal government is
currently trying to decide whether it should introduceTo date, only one Canadian decision has analysed
laws that would allow law enforcement agencies towhether anonymity is constitutionally protected by the
compel an ISP to disclose a user’s identity. 8 If an ISP wasright to free expression under section 2(b) of the Cana-
ordered to disclose such information, and this led to thedian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). In a
prosecution of the user, the defendant could claim atperfunctory analysis of only a few paragraphs, the Alberta
trial that the disclosure violated a right to anonymity. InCourt of Queen’s Bench, in Harper v. Canada, 1 decided
addition, governments have deliberately limited ano-that the  ability to make anonymous political donations
nymity in other ways. Those lobbying the federal gov-was not protected under section 2(b). This ruling was
ernment are required to register themselves, and to dis-explicitly limited to the circumstances of that case and
close who they are lobbying and why, under thethe Court did not engage in an extensive analysis of
Lobbyists Registration Act. 9 Breaches of the Act can beanonymous expression. Despite the lack of decisions to
punished by up to two years in prison, and by fines of update, there is a growing interest in anonymity, which
to $25,000. 10 When such a breach is prosecuted, thesuggests that more constitutional claims will be made. A
accused could defend the case by arguing that the limita-debate is currently raging about whether anonymous
tion on anonymity is unconstitutional. Finally, federalexpression on the Internet should be protected. On one
legislation currently allows an ISP to disclose personalside of the debate sit individual Internet users, who feel
information about its users to the government. 11 If ansafe in anonymously posting criticism on Internet bill-
Internet user wanted to remain anonymous from theboards about companies or individuals they dislike. On
government because he or she was criticising the govern-the other side sit individuals and corporations who have
ment, and such information was disclosed, the userbeen defamed by such criticism, and who seek limita-
might argue that this violated a right to anonymity.tions on anonymity because they want to be able to sue
Issues like the debate over anonymous expression on thethe tortfeasor. 2 Often, Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
Internet, the prosecution of Internet related offences, andwhich provide Internet access to individual users, are the
legislative limitations on anonymity, means it is neces-only organisations that know who the users are. Courts
sary to study whether anonymity is constitutionally pro-in both Canada and the United States have ordered ISPs
tected under section 2(b) of the Charter.to disclose the names and addresses of users who have
engaged in alleged defamation. 3 Individual interest in
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‘‘real’’ anonymity (except that the name chosen may hint atThe first part of this article will discuss what ano-
some aspects of ‘‘real’’ identity knowledge), (5) patternnymity is, and the costs and benefits that anonymity
knowledge, (6) social categorization, and (7) symbols of eligi-confers on expressive activity. I will demonstrate that bility/noneligibility. 13
anonymity is a double-edged sword in that it can both
Helen Nissenbaum points out that ‘‘the value ofpromote and harm free expression. In the second part, I
anonymity lies not in the capacity to be unnamed, but inwill suggest that there is no doubt that anonymity can be
the possibility of acting or participating in society whileprotected under section 2(b) of the Charter. When I first
remaining out of reach, remaining unreachable. ’’ 14began this article, I intended to examine ‘‘whether’’ ano-
Where others do not know your identity, you are notnymity can be constitutionally protected under sec-
reachable. With this in mind, the importance of thetion 2(b). As my research progressed, I quickly realised
forms of identity knowledge becomes clear. Legal name,that I was asking the wrong question. I discovered that
when combined with locatability, means that a person issection 2(b) has been interpreted so broadly by the
known to others and is easily reachable.Supreme Court of Canada that there is no doubt that
anonymity can be protected in some circumstances. When an individual interacts with society pseudon-However, since anonymity can harm free expression, and ymously, the individual is identified by the pseudonym.since Charter analysis is contextual, a more interesting An example of pseudonymous interaction occurs inand difficult question is how the courts will analyse ano- Internet chat rooms, where individuals identify them-nymity in a particular factual circumstance. What con- selves by email addresses or other pseudonyms whileceptual framework is necessary for a reasoned analysis of ‘‘chatting.’’ To the extent that the pseudonym can beanonymity to take place? linked to the individual’s legal name and location, he or
In the third part of the article, I will consider the she is reachable. Depending on the extent of pseudo-
case law under section 2(b) of the Charter. The objective nymity, a pseudonymous person can be faceless, sexless
will be to determine whether the current approach and ageless, with no identifiable race; a being capable of
taken by the courts to section 2(b) can accommodate an interacting with society without society knowing who it
analysis of anonymity. The model of expression that has is interacting with.
developed in the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurispru-
Pattern knowledge makes a person reachable to thedence (the jurisprudential model) will be discussed, and
extent that the person can be located through the pat-will be compared with a basic model of communication,
tern. As Marx puts it, in ‘‘everyday occurrences (say,which is taken from elementary communication theory
riding the subway each day at 8 a.m.), we may come to(the communication model). This study will reveal that
‘know’ other  riders in the sense of recognising them.’’ 15the jurisprudential model has developed beyond the
Social categorization identifies individuals through theirview in Irwin Toy v. Quebec that expression is made up
membership in some group (for example, VISA creditof form and content. It will also reveal that the jurispru-
card holders). Anonymity is limited to the extent thatdential model resembles an impoverished version of the
others do not know who the members of the group are.communication model. The comparison will demon-
If, for example, the police do not know the legal identitystrate that the jurisprudential model is inadequate, and is
of a suspect, but know that the suspect holds a Generalunable to accommodate a proper analysis of anonymity.
Motors (GM) VISA card, the police could obtain a list ofI will conclude by suggesting that the approach to
GM card holders, and use this as a starting point to trackfreedom of expression must be developed if anonymity
down the suspect. Symbols of eligibility or non-eligi-is to be properly analysed under section 2(b), and will
bility, such as passwords to log-on to a computer net-describe how this development should occur.
work, allow persons to be identified with respect to par-
ticular activities. Those who are entitled to log-on are
distinguished from those who are not. Only when no
forms of identity knowledge exist with respect to anWhat is Anonymity? 
individual can that individual be said to be perfectly
efore we can consider when anonymity may be anonymous.B protected under section 2(b) of the Charter, we first
Anonymity exists in various degrees. Marx’s forms ofneed to understand what ‘‘anonymity’’ means, and why
identity knowledge demonstrate that anonymity existsanonymity is important.
in varying degrees. A person’s anonymity decreases as theAnonymity refers to identity knowledge. A person is
number of forms of identity knowledge increase. Certainanonymous when he or she is ‘‘not named or identified’’:
forms of anonymity are perfect, or nearly perfect, in thewhen his or her identity is not known.12 Having said
sense that the anonymous individual’s identity can neverthis, ‘‘identity’’ is not synonymous with ‘‘legal name.’’
be discovered by others. A letter to the editor is a goodGary Marx identifies seven forms of identity knowledge:
example: if you send an unsigned letter to the editor via
(1) legal name, (2) locatability, (3) pseudonyms that can be Canada Post through the physical mail with no returnlinked to legal name and/or locatability — literally a form of
address, it will be impossible (or nearly impossible) forpseudo-anonymity, (4) pseudonyms that cannot be linked to





























































Many forms of anonymity are imperfect. Individ- In deciding whether and how to legislate with
uals, who will be referred to here as ‘‘users’’, access the respect to anonymity and SLAPP suits, governments
Internet through Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Often, must balance interests in free expression against the
these users adopt a pseudonym, and log on to the rights of corporations not to be defamed. Legislation
Internet and interact with others under this pseu- could be introduced that dictates when legal identity can
donym.16 Each user’s computer has a unique Internet be disclosed by an ISP. The legislation could make it
protocol (IP) address, which is the electronic equivalent difficult for ISPs to disclose a user’s legal identity, which
of a physical mailing address. Whenever a user interacts would protect anonymity. 23 The legislation could also
online with another user, their computers must make it easy for ISPs to disclose legal identity, in which
exchange IP addresses. This allows each computer to case anonymity would be limited. The extent of the
send data to the other computer. Without knowing each protection or limitation on anonymity would depend on
others’ IP addresses, the two computers could not com- the way the regulation was drafted, which shows that
municate. If a user posts something on an Internet bill- anonymity can be regulated in degrees.
board under a pseudonym, the user’s IP address can be
Anonymity only exists as an aspect of an underlyingrecorded by the billboard host, and the IP address can be
interaction. 24 Anonymity does not exist in the abstract.retrieved. The IP address can be traced to the user’s ISP.
Since the extent of anonymity is a function of identityThe ISP will usually have the information linking the IP
knowledge, anonymity between two beings can onlyaddress to the user’s legal identity and physical address. If
exist when there is some direct or indirect interactiona court orders the ISP to disclose the information, 17 the
between those two beings. Anonymity requires, at a min-user’s anonymity will be eliminated. While there are
imum, one being’s awareness of the anonymous being’smethods of protecting anonymity, by using technologies
existence, which requires an interaction. If you havesuch as anonymous remailers, this technology is imper-
never heard of a writer, or have had no interaction with afect and can be broken. 18 As a result, it has been argued
writer, either directly (by reading one of the writer’sthat all anonymity on the Internet is a myth. 19 What this
works), or indirectly (by hearing about the writer frommeans is that while a user maintains some degree of
some other source), it would be incorrect to describe theanonymity by using a pseudonym, the user is anony-
writer as anonymous. Rather, he or she is unknown tomous only to the extent that the ISP cannot be forced to
you. Only after some interaction takes place betweendisclose the user’s identity.
yourself and the writer, perhaps by your reading a review
A corollary of anonymity existing in degrees is that about one of the writer’s books, can the writer be said to
anonymity can be regulated in degrees. Regulators, when be known to you. Anonymity will exist when you are
deciding whether anonymity should be limited, are not aware of the writer’s existence, but do not know any of
faced with a choice between completely eliminating, or the forms of identity knowledge that could be used to
absolutely protecting anonymity. There is an ongoing identify the writer. The most common interaction
debate about whether governments should legislate to involving anonymity is communication, which requires
protect Internet users from SLAPP suits. A SLAPP suit is expression.
‘‘Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation’’, a law
suit brought by a corporation that is intended to ‘‘intimi- The importance of anonymity varies with the
date its critics into silence.’’ 20 The Internet has been underlying expression. A person may decide to post
described as a ‘‘democratising’’ tool that gives the disen- comments on an Internet billboard anonymously
franchised a voice because the Internet is a cheap and because he or she fears retaliation about those com-
efficient method of expressing ideas to the world. 21 It ments. In such circumstances, anonymity is vital to the
allows individuals to criticise powerful entities such as expressive activity. When a person drives into a full-serve
corporations. Individuals can post criticism on Internet gas station, asks for a fill-up, and pays using cash, the
billboards at virtually no expense. SLAPP suits are likely transaction is anonymous to a degree, because the
to silence such critics because individual Internet users driver’s legal identity is not known to the gas-station
will not have the time or resources to fight such a suit, attendant. The driver probably does not care one way or
regardless of its merits. Unfortunately, the Internet also another whether the attendant knows the driver’s legal
allows individuals to engage in irresponsible speech and identity, so anonymity has no impact on this transaction.
deliberate defamation. In HealthSouth Corp. v. John
Doe, which later became HealthSouth Corp v. Krum, a Both the expresser and the receiver of a communi-
disgruntled ex-employee of HealthSouth Corp posted cation can be anonymous. The person who picks up a
false information that the CEO of HealthSouth had book in the library can read anonymously unless he or
committed fraud. The employee also falsely stated that she takes the book out. The Supreme Court of Canada
he was having an affair with the CEO’s wife. 22 Internet has held that both expression and reception of informa-
anonymity is a barrier to defamation and SLAPP suits tion is protected by freedom of expression. 25 As such, in
because users can only be sued if the corporation any constitutional debate that considers anonymity, we
bringing the suit can discover the alleged defamer’s iden- must be concerned both with expressers’ and receivers’
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Anonymity may be a group or an individual charac- to expression. To do this, we should examine the costs
teristic. In mass media communications, the audience’s and benefits that anonymity confers on expression,
anonymity is a group characteristic. 26 The expresser may before going on to conduct an analysis under sec-
also be an anonymous group. When documentaries are tion 2(b) of the Charter.
produced, hundreds of people may be involved in the
production. The message conveyed by the narrator may
be the product of the producer’s mind, the director’s
mind, the writer’s mind, or the TV station owner’s mind. Costs and Benefits of Anonymity 
The author of the message is unknown to the audience,
any constitutional rights carry costs as well as ben-though the medium through which the message is M efits. The accused’s right to a fair trial, for example,expressed (the announcer) is visible. The message may
can be used to invade the privacy and equality rights ofalso be the product of a collaborative effort, in which
victims. Individuals accused of sexual assault frequentlycase the group is represented by the announcer, in a
sought disclosure of the complainant’s therapy records inform of pseudonymous anonymity. Constitutional pro-
order to gain information that could be used to chal-tection for anonymity may protect both group and indi-
lenge the credibility of the victim.27 Complainants feltvidual interests.
that their privacy was being invaded by this, and thatIn communication, anonymity may be purposefully they were being treated differently from other victims. 28relied upon, or it may arise necessarily. In some circum- Rules which benefited the accused’s section 11(d )
stances, anonymity will only exist if one party to a com- Charter right to a fair trial were costs to the complain-
munication deliberately chooses to withhold his or her ants’ Charter-protected privacy and equality rights. The
identity, such as an Internet user placing a message on a costs of the section 11(d) right harmed different Charter
billboard, but choosing not to affix his or her name. In rights. The courts have held, in such cases, that the bal-
other circumstances, anonymity must exist by the very ancing of interests should occur under section 1 of the
nature of the communication. The audience in mass Charter, rather than at the stage of considering the right
media communications is invariably anonymous. As an itself. 29 Anonymity is different, not because it has costs,
example, the Webmasters of high-volume Web sites will but because some of the costs and benefits of anonymity
rarely know the identities of all those browsing their are related to the same Charter right: freedom of expres-
Web sites because of the large number of visits. The sion. It is important to remember that freedom of expres-
government could attempt to eliminate anonymity sion protects ‘‘listeners as well as speakers’’, 30 and as we
where it arises necessarily in mass-media Internet com- will see, cases may arise where anonymity is a benefit to
munications, perhaps by requiring Web sites to record the speaker, but is a cost to the listener, and vice versa.
all visits and disclose this information to the government.
Such an elimination could result in an Orwellian situa- Anonymity can both encourage and discourage
tion, where every person’s move in cyberspace is expression. Anonymous communication allows dis-
recorded, and later reported to the state. Society’s liberty senting or unpopular opinions to be presented in cir-
interests may demand that anonymity in mass commu- cumstances where, if the speaker was known, he or she
nications be protected. would suffer embarrassment, oppression, arrest, torture
or even death. People who would not express themselvesAnonymity may be integral to a communication, if their identities were published may be willing to speakbecoming part of the message being communicated, or it anonymously. 31 By hiding identity, anonymity allowsmay be distinguishable from, and tenuously linked to, individuals to place themselves beyond the reach of athe message. When an infamous person decides to pub- coercive state or other oppressive forces. 32 Where it islish a political work representing a despised minority’s dangerous or unpopular to express particular viewpoints,view, and does so anonymously, the anonymity is a vital anonymity encourages such expression. ‘‘Thomas Paine’spart of that work. In hiding the writer, readers are less Common Sense, acclaimed as the work which sparkedlikely to be influenced by biases they would normally Americans to think about separating from Britain, wasfeel about that person. This influences the interpretation first published signed simply ‘An Englishman’.’’ 33 If theof the work. The fact that it is published anonymously English government knew who the author was, Painemay also be a subliminal message to the reader about the might have faced reprisals. Minorities particularly benefitwork: ‘‘This work is so important and dangerous to those from anonymity. In 1958, the Alabama state governmentin power that I, the writer, can not attach my name to it.’’ tried to force the NAACP to reveal the names of itsWhere this occurs, anonymity becomes part of the con- members. The racist overtones of that situation were atent of the message. Anonymity may also be tenuously serious threat to the group’s continued existence. In thelinked to the communication. When the driver at the gas context of Ku Klux Klan bombings and other raciallystation asks for gas, the transaction is the same, whether motivated attacks, revealing the members of the associa-the attendant is dealing with a ‘‘Sarah’’, or a ‘‘Denise.’’ tion could have placed their lives at risk; hardly a condu-
We now have an understanding of what anonymity cive atmosphere to freedom of association and expres-





























































NAACP’s refusal to release the names, which protected vidual wishes to seek help for a personal problem, pri-
the members’ anonymity. 34 If anonymity is limited, such vacy can be vital. If the individual is embarrassed about
groups may be less willing to speak out. the problem, he or she is unlikely to seek help if the
problem will become public knowledge. Privacy is anUnfortunately, anonymity can also be used to dis-
important human need, and intimate personal commu-courage expression. Although hate-speech is prohibited
nications are vital for human health. 45 Anonymity isby law,35 the law can be evaded by engaging in anony-
used to encourage individuals to engage in therapy, or tomous hate-speech. This hate-speech may discourage
receive medical attention. 46 As an example, governmentsmembers of the targeted group from expressing them-
keep records of those suffering from communicable dis-selves. 36 Accordingly, it is inaccurate to assume that ano-
eases, such as AIDS. In an effort to prevent the spread ofnymity always benefits free expression, and we must
AIDS, governments released the medical status of AIDSrecognise that the effect anonymity has on expression
sufferers to their family, friends, employers, and pastwill vary in each case.
sexual partners. Fear of this occurring has discouragedWhile anonymity can encourage expression, ano- people from taking AIDS tests, which, ironically, contrib-nymity lowers the quality of expression. Anonymity uted to the spread of the disease. As a result, anonymouseliminates accountability and encourages irresponsible AIDS tests are now widely available, and are frequentlyexpression. 37 While there is a massive amount of anony- used. Anonymity can be used to encourage private com-mous communication on the Internet, much of it has munications by bolstering confidentiality.little value, being no better than mindless gossip or innu-
While anonymity can be used to protect an indi-endo.38 Those criticising others are more likely to do so
vidual by ensuring their privacy, anonymity allowsresponsibly if they have to identify themselves, because
others to engage in attacks by disguising their identity. Intheir speech may have consequences. 39
the ‘‘Strange Case of the Electronic Lover’’, a male psy-Anonymity can both facilitate detection of crime, chologist frequented an Internet chat-room, pretendingand make it easier to evade detection. Witnesses to to be female. This pretence was a form of pseudonymouscrimes will be more willing to come forward when they anonymity. He used this to get female Internet users tocan do so anonymously, which is why ‘‘Crime Stoppers’’ open up to him, and to discuss their problems. Whileis anonymous. Whistleblowers are more likely to expose this psychologist was apparently able to help some of thetheir employer’s negligence or illegality, if they can do so women, some of his victims felt betrayed when theywithout destroying their careers. 40 Unfortunately, ano- discovered his gender. 47 This suggests that while ano-nymity also facilitates crime and other harmful behav- nymity may encourage private communications, it mayiors. Online harassment has been identified as a growing also facilitate abuse. Fear of such abuse may discourageproblem.41 If an Internet user wishes to harass or make therapeutic relationships.threats to another user, the harasser can use anonymity
We can see from this analysis that anonymity is ato avoid detection and prosecution.
double-edged sword. While anonymity may encourageAnonymity both improves and inhibits under- expression and communication, it can also have thestanding. The understanding of any communication is opposite effect. It may be correct to say that anonymityinfluenced by the perceptions of those receiving it. 42 By will often promote expression, but it does not follow thatshielding the identity of a writer, anonymity prevents a anonymity will always promote expression. Now that wereader’s pre-conceived notions about the author from have examined the costs, benefits, and nature of ano-altering the reader’s reaction to a message. This is partic- nymity, we should consider whether anonymity can beularly useful for those who would be ignored if their protected under section 2(b) of the Charter.identity was known. Currer, Ellis and Acton Bell are
prime examples. 43 If the Brontës’ identities as women
had been known, their novels might never have been
Can Anonymity be Protected Underpublished.
Section 2(b)? However, freedom of expression protects both
speakers and listeners, and anonymity can hamper a nonymity can be protected under section 2(b) of
reader’s ability to read critically. Our knowledge and A the Charter. Historically, anonymity has been inte-
experience of a writer allows us to assess the writer’s gral to the exercise of free expression, having been used
reliability and worth, so it is more difficult to trust anon- time and time again by people speaking out against
ymous writers. 44 In assessing information leaked from repressive regimes. 48 Section 2(b) protects all expression,
the government by an ‘‘unnamed source’’, the public no matter how repulsive, including hate speech, solicita-
would be better able to assess the value of the informa- tion for the purposes of prostitution, and pornography. 49
tion if they knew whether it came from the prime min- Much of this expression lies far from the core values
ister’s mouth or a disgruntled backbencher who had just underlying section 2(b). Since anonymity has been used
been demoted from cabinet. to allow political expression, which lies at the very center
Anonymity encourages private communications, of these values, it seems intuitive that anonymity can fall
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firms this. Imagine that the Canadian government enacts made up of components and actors, which are consid-
legislation stating that no criticism of the governing ered within an analytical framework.
political party can be published unless the author of the The first components of expression recognised by
criticism is identified, but that criticism of opposition the Supreme Court of Canada can be found in Ford v.
parties can be anonymous. In such a situation, the pur- Quebec. 55 The court held that language ‘‘is so intimately
pose of the legislation is to stifle criticism of the gov- related to the form and content of expression that there
erning party, and to encourage criticism of the opposi- cannot be true freedom of expression by means of lan-
tion. The underlying activity, political criticism, is guage if one is prohibited from using the language of
expressive, and the purpose of the legislation is to limit one’s choice.’’ 56 In Irwin Toy v. Quebec, 57 Dickson C.J.
free expression. It is difficult to imagine a court refusing stated that expression ‘‘has both a content and a form,
to find that the legislation was an unconstitutional limi- and the two can be inextricably connected.’’ 58 Content is
tation on free expression. the message to be conveyed. 59 Form was not defined, but
In my view, there is no doubt that anonymity can Dickson C.J. stated there are an ‘‘infinite variety of forms
be protected under section 2(b), so I will not discuss this of expression: for example, the written or spoken word,
issue further here. 50 However, this does not help us the arts, and even physical gestures or acts.’’ 60 It seems
decide the more difficult question of whether anonymity that form refers to the physical manner in which a mes-
should be protected in a particular case. Constitutional sage is conveyed. Thus, the Supreme Court’s earliest
analysis requires a contextual approach, 51 and courts do jurisprudence suggested that expression was made up of
not deal with Charter rights in the abstract. A claim of two components, form and content, which were inextri-
constitutional protection for anonymity may arise in any cably linked. This has cast a shadow over much of the
number of situations: commercial Internet transactions jurisprudence and academic writing since, with many
can occur anonymously; 52 individuals may post anony- jurists thinking of expression as if it were made up only
mous insults on an Internet billboard; a murderer may of form and content. As we will see, the Supreme Court
select victims through online interactions, using ano- has moved beyond this primitive model.
nymity to conceal his or her identity; a person may write Three more components have now beenanonymous political leaflets. In each of these scenarios, recognised: time, medium and forum. The time at whichthe interests at stake are different. It follows that the need expressive activity occurs is identified in both Canadianto protect anonymity will vary, depending on the cir- and U.S. jurisprudence, and is susceptible to regulation, 61cumstances of each case. but there is no specific ‘‘test’’ in Canada that the courts
The remaining sections of this paper will address can apply to deal with limitations on ‘‘time.’’ This is not
the question of when anonymity should be protected surprising, as the courts have not needed to grapple with
under section 2(b) of the Charter. The focus will be a case concerning limitations on the times at which
entirely on how the courts should decide whether a expressive activity can occur.
particular use of anonymity falls within the scope of
If the form is the physical means through whichsection 2(b) of the Charter, and whether a limitation on
expression occurs, the medium is the method throughanonymity violates section 2(b). I will not examine the
which the message is conveyed. 62 A written documentframework of analysis under section 1 of the Charter
may be conveyed through the medium of a magazine,because this analysis is highly contextual, depending
printed in a book, sent by an email, or posted on a Webheavily on the facts of each case. 53 I am attempting to
site. While the Supreme Court of Canada has identifiedsuggest a general approach that could be used to analyse
‘‘medium’’ as an aspect of communication, 63 no analyt-anonymity under section 2(b). This is necessarily an
ical framework has been developed to determine whenabstract question, making a consideration of section 1
limitations on a medium are constitutionally permis-difficult.
sible. It is unclear, for example, how the courts will ana-
lyse state limitations on Internet use, such as the federal
government’s recent proposals that, if adopted, wouldThe Supreme Court’s Model of require Internet service providers to ‘‘develop or deploy
Expression systems providing interception capability’’; essentially, to
allow wiretaps of email accounts. 64 As with ‘‘time’’, this isreedom of expression has been constitutionally
probably because the court has not yet been faced withF enshrined in section 2(b) of the Charter, which pro-
arguments over a limitation on the use of a medium.65tects ‘‘freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expres-
sion, including freedom of the press and other media of Forum has been identified as an aspect of expres-
communication’’. 54 The objective of this article is to sion in academic literature, 66 and has been the subject of
determine how anonymity should be analysed under three Supreme Court of Canada decisions. These cases
section 2(b). To do this, it is first necessary to examine will be discussed in some detail below, as they have
the model of expression that has developed and grown contributed significantly to the development of the ana-
through the Supreme Court’s post-Charter freedom of lytical framework within which section 2(b) claims are





























































pose is to restrict a form of expression in order to controlIn addition to the components of expression, the
access by others to the meaning being conveyed or to con-Supreme Court has recognised that freedom of expres-
trol the ability of the one conveying the meaning to do so, itsion can involve two actors, both of whom are deserving also limits the guarantee. On the other hand, where the
of protection: those who create expression, and those government aims to control only the physical consequences
of certain human activity, regardless of the meaning beingwho receive it. Section 2(b) protects listeners as well as
conveyed, its purpose is not to control freedom of expres-speakers, readers as well as writers. 68
sion83 [emphasis added].
Although freedom of expression had been consid-
Where the effect of the state regulation or action isered in both Dolphin Delivery, 69 and Ford v. Quebec, 70
to limit expression, section 2(b) will be infringed onlyit was not until Irwin Toy that a framework for analysing
where the expressive activity promotes one of the ‘‘prin-section 2(b) claims was developed. 71 The government of
ciples and values underlying the freedom.’’ 84 These prin-Quebec had banned certain forms of advertising, at cer-
ciples are:tain times of day, in order to protect children. Irwin Toy
advertised in a prohibited manner, and was charged. The (1) Seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently good
corporation defended the case, claiming the legislation activity; (2) participation in social and political decision-
violated the corporation’s section 2(b) rights. The govern- making is to be fostered and encouraged; (3) the diversity in
forms of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishingment responded by arguing that commercial speech did
ought to be cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeednot fall within the scope of section 2(b), that if it did,
welcoming, environment not only for the sake of those whosection 2(b) was not violated, and if it was, the legislation convey a meaning, but also for the sake of those to whom it
was saved under section 1. is conveyed. 85
Under the framework developed to address the Virtually any expressive activity could be said toissues raised in Irwin Toy, the first step is to ask whether promote at least one of these principles. As such, underthe activity at issue falls within the scope of freedom of the Irwin Toy approach, the finding that an activity fallsexpression. This will occur if the activity is expressive. within the scope of section 2(b), combined with a‘‘Activity is expressive if it attempts to convey a meaning. finding that the activity has been limited by state action,That meaning is its content.’’ 72 Decisions since Irwin Toy will ordinarily lead to a conclusion that freedom ofhave confirmed that no matter how repugnant, ‘‘all con- expression has been violated.tent of expression’’ falls within the scope of sec-
tion 2(b), 73 even hate speech, 74 obscene materials, 75 solic- Once a violation is found, the analysis proceeds to
itation for the purpose of prostitution, 76 possession of section 1 of the Charter. As section 2(b) is so broad, most
child pornography, 77 and commercial speech. 78 balancing between free expression and other state and
We cannot . . . exclude human activity from the scope of societal interests occurs under section 1. In R v. Keegstra,
guaranteed free expression on the basis of the content or for example, limitations on hate speech were found to
meaning being conveyed. Indeed, if the activity conveys or violate section 2(b). It was under section 1 that the
attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content, and Supreme Court balanced the interests of those targetedprima facie falls within the scope of the guarantee. 79
by hate speech, the interest in free expression, and the
Although all content is protected, an expressive interest of society that its members be free from the
activity may fall outside the scope of section 2(b) if it insidious and unwarranted attacks in hate speech. 86
takes an impermissible form. So far, the Supreme Court Later cases confirmed that content-based restrictions
has held that the only form of expression which will always violated section 2(b), though such restrictions
always fall outside the scope of section 2(b) is violence. 80 could be saved under section 1. 87 This approach means
However, the meaning of ‘‘violence’’ encompasses only the balancing process under section 1 is vital to freedom
physical violence. Speech that is intended to encourage of expression analysis. As so many factors may be consid-
violence, such as hate speech, does not fall within this ered, the section 1 analysis is highly contextual, varying
exception. 81 with the issues raised by each case.
If an activity falls within the scope of protection,
There has been some development of the analyticalsection 2(b) will be infringed if either the purpose or
framework in the hate speech cases: Keegstra andeffect of a state regulation or action is to limit freedom of
Zundel. In Keegstra, it was argued that hate-speechexpression. 82 Where the state’s purpose is to limit expres-
should fall outside the scope of section 2(b) because thesion by selecting between acceptable and unacceptable
targets of hate-speech would, because of the speech, becontent, section 2(b) will be automatically violated, and
afraid to express themselves. The Supreme Court heldthe Charter analysis must proceed to section 1. This
that it should consider the detrimental effects of hatemeans that every content-based restriction necessarily
speech under section 1, rather than at the scope stage ofhas a purpose of limiting expression, which means every
analysis. 88 In Zundel, the court rejected an argument thatcontent-based restriction violates section 2(b).
falsehoods should fall outside the scope of section 2(b),
If the government’s purpose is to restrict the content holding that even deliberate lies may have expressiveof expression by singling out particular meanings
value. 89 These cases suggest that the detrimental effectsthat are not to be conveyed, it necessarily limits the
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rights should not be considered at the scope stage of which was supported by two other judges, an expressive
analysis. activity in a public forum will fall within the scope of
section 2(b) when the activity is consistent with theSince the Irwin Toy decision, and with the excep- public forum’s function. As an example, Lamer C.J. sug-tion of Keegstra and Zundel, the section 2(b) analytical gests that picketing by blocking a major highway wouldframework has not developed extensively in cases where not fall within the scope of protection because picketingthe issue is a content-based restriction, such as the por- in that place conflicts with the forum’s purpose, which isnography and solicitation cases. This is because sec- to allow for traffic flow. McLachlin J., who was also sup-tion 2(b) is so broad that the most significant analysis ported by two other judges, held that ‘‘a threshold test istook place under section 1. I do not suggest by this that required to screen out cases falling outside the freeour understanding of section 2(b) has not developed in speech guarantee before reaching the section 1 anal-content-based cases. The cases involving child pornog- ysis.’’ 96 Under her approach, the use of a particular forumraphy, obscenity, and commercial speech90 have clarified for expressive activity will fall within the scope of sec-that the scope of section 2(b) is very broad, and they have tion 2(b) in two circumstances: (1) when the governmenthighlighted the difficult issues raised by different types of restriction on forum-use is aimed at the content ofspeech. They have improved our understanding that expression; (2) if the expression at issue promotes one ofsome types of expression lie near the core of sec- the purposes underlying the freedom of expression guar-tion 2(b)’s values, and others lie far from it. 91 What I am antee. 97 We know from the cases involving content-suggesting is that the basic framework of analysis, which based restrictions on expression that if a public forum isinvolves a consideration of section 2(b)’s scope and viola- not involved, an expressive activity automatically fallstion, has not significantly been altered by the content- within the scope of section 2(b) merely because it isbased cases. expressive. This means that, in Justice McLachlin’s view,
the scope of section 2(b) can be limited by reducing theThe Supreme Court was forced to develop the
forums available for expression.Irwin Toy analytical framework when it dealt with limi-
tations on expression that were not based on content. L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s approach would have the use
This development occurred in the public forum cases: of any public forum for any expressive activity fall within
Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada, 92 and the scope of section 2(b), even a public demonstration in
Ramsden v. Peterborough City. 93 In Commonwealth, the the Supreme Court Chambers. L’Heureux-Dubé J. resists
Supreme Court held that public political expression in any narrowing of section 2(b), and she would balance
airports was constitutionally protected. 94 In Ramsden, the Charter claimant’s interests with state interests
the court held that postering on public telephone poles entirely under section 1. To this extent, she is in dissent.
was also protected. 95 In both cases, the state prevented
In Peterborough City v. Ramsden, 98 the Courtexpression not on the grounds that the particular speech
refused to choose between the three Commonwealthat issue was harmful, but on the basis that those expres-
approaches. Despite this, Ramsden developed the analyt-sing themselves could not do so in a particular public
ical framework by clarifying that there is a two-steplocation (public forum). While the issue was limited to
approach to determining whether a non-content aspectprotection of forum, these decisions are the only ones
of an expressive activity falls within the scope of sec-that have engaged in an in-depth analysis of limitations
tion 2(b):that are not based on content. The framework that has
developed under the forum cases should be considered Under Irwin Toy, supra, there are two basic steps in the
s. 2(b) analysis. First, one must determine whether thewhen dealing with other non-content-based limitations.
activity at issue falls within the scope of s. 2(b). This f irstAs we will see later, anonymity should be regarded as a
step is itself a two-part inquiry. Does postering con-non-content aspect of expression, so we will consider the stitute expression? If so, is postering on public prop-
forum case law here. erty protected by s. 2(b)? Under the second step of the
s. 2(b) analysis, one must determine whether the purpose orThe decision in Commonwealth, while unanimous effect of the by-law is to restrict freedom of expression99
in the result, contained six separate opinions from a [emphasis added].
panel of seven judges. These opinions contain three dis-
Cases considering free expression since Ramsdentinct approaches: those of Lamer C.J., McLachlin J. (as she
have not developed the section 2(b) analytical frame-then was), and L’Heureux-Dubé J. Although none of the
work. In R v. Guignard, 100 the Supreme Court was againapproaches received the signatures of a majority of
faced with a claim that a particular forum was protected,judges, the reasons of Lamer C.J. and McLachlin J. dis-
but the Court did not address the jurisprudential disputeclose agreement on one point: some public forums can
within Commonwealth. We can see, then, that the ana-be excluded from the scope of section 2(b). Together,
lytical framework under section 2(b) is unclear withtheir judgments were supported by a majority of the
respect to the scope of section 2(b), because of the threecourt, so this point is a binding precedent. This repre-
different Commonwealth approaches.sents a move away from the traditional Irwin Toy
approach, under which all expressive activities fall within One last comment should be made. The Supreme





























































neutrality in its free-expression analysis. The Court had contains those aspects of expression that are not the
held, time and time again, that it is undesirable to place message to be conveyed; form, forum, time, medium,
content-based limits on expression. Free expression is and language. This grouping is required because the
‘‘little less vital to man’s mind and spirit than breathing is Irwin Toy framework requires courts to analyse content
to his physical existence’’. 101 In a based limitations differently from non-content based
limitations. All content automatically falls within thefree, pluralistic and democratic society we prize a diversity
scope of section 2(b), regardless of its value, and content-of ideals and opinions for their inherent value to both the
based limitations always violate section 2(b) of thecommunity and to the individual. Free expression was for
Cardozo J. of the United States Supreme Court the matrix, Charter. We see this from the treatment, referred to
the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of earlier, of obscene materials, hate-speech, child-pornog-
freedom102 [internal quotes removed]. raphy and solicitation. Non-content aspects of expression
do not automatically fall within the scope of section 2(b),As John Stuart Mill has stated, it
as we see from the violence exception and the public-is as evident in itself, as any amount of argument can make
forum cases. The original model, in which expressionit, that ages are no more infallible than individuals; every age
was regarded as being made up of form and content, ishaving held many opinions which subsequent ages have
deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that no longer accurate, so jurists should avoid thinking of
many opinions now general will be rejected by future ages, expression in these terms.
as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the pre-
sent. 103 The question we are considering is how the courts
should analyse anonymity at the scope and violationFor these reasons, the courts wish to avoid basing
stages of the section 2(b) analysis. The model of expres-constitutional protection on a judge’s perception of an
sion currently in existence poses several problems. Ano-expressive activity’s value. The Irwin Toy approach is
nymity can be so closely linked to the message to becompletely content-neutral at the scope stage, and com-
conveyed that it becomes part of that message, but it canpletely content-neutral at the violation stage when the
also be tenuously linked to an expressive activity. If welimitation on expression is purposeful. All content of
conduct a traditional Irwin Toy analysis, it seems that weexpression, no matter how repugnant, falls within the
have to categorise it. But as what? Content? Non-con-scope of section 2(b), and every content-based limitation
tent? Both? Neither? We also know that in some circum-on expression violates section 2(b). 104 This does not
stances, anonymity may actually discourage expression.mean that the value of expression is irrelevant to
Yet the hate-speech cases suggest that even if an expres-whether the expression should be protected. Value has
sive activity does discourage expression, it still fallsalways been relevant under section 1, where the interests
within the scope of section 2(b). Does this mean thatin expression are balanced with other state and societal
anonymity will always be protected, even when it under-interests. Content-neutrality is most important at the
mines free expression? Should the public forumscope stage, and least important under section 1, because
approach, which excludes some forums from the scopethe burden under section 2(b) lies on the individual,
of section 2(b), be extended to include anonymity? Butwhereas under section 1, the burden lies on the state. 105
how would this work?It could be argued that considering value at the violation
stage is no more dangerous than at the scope stage,
because the burden still lies on the individual. The diffi-
culty with this argument is that value is only relevant if
A Model Provided Bythe violation is effects-based. As such, an individual may
Communication Theory never need to prove that the expression promotes one of
the section 2(b) values. For these reasons, it can be said
efore deciding how to analyse anonymity, wethat the Supreme Court has established a principle of B should first evaluate the strengths and weaknessescontent-neutrality, and this principle is most important
within the Supreme Court’s model. We will then be in aat the scope stage of section 2(b) analysis.
position to try and determine how the case law should
The components of expression and framework of be developed to accommodate anonymity. In con-
analysis allow us to identify a basic model of expression. ducting this analysis, it will be useful to compare the
The model’s participants are listeners and speakers, and Supreme Court’s model of expression with another
expression is made up of the following components: model — that provided by communications theory.
form, content, time, medium, forum and language.
There is no reason to believe that this list is exhaustive. Several models of communication have been devel-
These components must be analysed as if they belonged oped by communication theorists, though most share
to one of two groups: ‘‘content’’ or ‘‘non-content.’’ The some basic characteristics. One diagrammatic model,
content group contains those aspects of expression that which is frequently used to describe the communication
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Figure 1: A Basic Model of Communication 
This basic model describes communication as a waves. Reception occurs when the sound enters the
symbolic process, in which a source (the person wishing host’s ears, causing the eardrum to vibrate. The message
to communicate), produces a message to be communi- is then decoded by the host’s brain, which interprets the
cated, with the intent of producing some effect on the electrical impulses produced by the vibration of the ear-
destination. The message is ‘‘encoded’’, which means it is drums. Only then has communication occurred. The
converted into symbols, which are a form suitable for communication will only be successful if both the source
transmission. The message is then transmitted through and receiver share an understanding of the symbols
the channel (or medium) of communication. After trans- involved. Both must be able to hear sounds, and both
mission, the message is received by the destination, must recognise that the sound ‘‘salt’’ represents the salt
which is the person for whom the communication is shaker on the table.
intended. Reception is not enough for communication As the model indicates, communication involves
to occur, 107 and should not be equated with under- more than merely the preparation, encoding, transmis-
standing. The destination must decode the message sion and decoding of a message. Communication occurs
before it can be understood. For successful communica- in a context; will not be successful unless both the source
tion, the message must be decoded in such a way that and destination share fields of experience; involves feed-
the message means the same thing that it did before it back; and can be distorted by noise.
was encoded. This means that both the source and the
Communication is said to occur within a contextdestination must share the same understanding of the
because the same symbols can mean different things insymbols. I will illustrate this process using a simple
different circumstances. The words ‘‘I had a rough daydinner conversation as an example, before explaining the
today’’ have completely different meanings to an officemodel further.
worker who speaks to a colleague at the bar, and to aThe information source is a dinner guest who wants
soldier who is reporting to a superior officer about aher host (the destination), to pass the salt. The guest’s
battle involving many casualties. Context may bebrain produces the message, but the thoughts produced
required before the message can be properly understood.by the brain cannot be understood or even recognised
by the host. The dinner guest’s brain encodes the mes- Communication cannot occur unless the source
sage by ordering the guest’s mouth and voice box to and destination share fields of experience. 108 At its most
produce the sound pattern; ‘‘Would you please pass the basic level, this means that the source and destination
salt.’’ The sounds ‘‘Would you please pass the salt’’, are must assign the same meaning to the same symbols.
symbols representing the actor (‘‘you’’, which refers to Both parties must speak the same language to be able to
the host), the action (passing), and the subject of the communicate. There are many fields of experience, how-
action (salt). The words also contain symbols that iden- ever, and fields of experience may overlap imperfectly.
tify the communication as a polite request (Would you While this paper is written in English, this does not
please), rather than an order. The channel of communi- mean that every person who can read English will be
cation is air molecules, which transmit sound through capable of comprehending this article. The article
vibration. When the guest’s voice box produces the assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of






























































conflict with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free- lished later. However, in Anglo-Canadian culture, such
doms may be of no force and effect. If a reader’s field of behaviour is perceived to be a sign that someone is lying.
experience does not include this knowledge, this article Anglo-Canadians are more likely to believe someone
may be misunderstood. who speaks confidently while looking them in the eye.
As a result, it has been suggested that members of theFeedback is transmitted from the destination to the
First Nations are at an inherent disadvantage whensource, and tells the source whether the message is being
being tried by Anglo-Canadian judges and jurors.decoded and interpreted as the source intended it to be.
Demeanor that was intended by a First Nations witnessWe receive feedback both from our destination, and
to be a respectful attitude towards the lawyers and judgefrom our messages. 109 As an example, if the dinner guest
during questioning is likely to be interpreted by thewas tired, and said ‘‘sugar’’, rather than salt, he or she
Anglo-Canadian judge or juror as a sign that the witnessmight hear this and correct the message. In our simple
is unable to speak the truth. 113example, feedback might occur by the host passing the
Meaning is more than a dictionary definition, andsalt, which would indicate that the message had been
the meaning ascribed to a message by the informationunderstood. If the host responded by passing the sugar,
source is not necessarily the same as the message under-this feedback would indicate that the message had been
stood by the receiver. Different destinations may under-misunderstood. Feedback means that in most, if not all
stand the same message differently, because of how theycommunication, parties are sender-receivers, 110 with
perceive and decode the symbols. As an example, theboth parties simultaneously sending and receiving
meaning of a work of literature may differ depending onmessages. When a person speaks to another, the speaker
who is reading it. George Orwell’s Animal Farm mightevaluates his or her words through the reactions of the
be interpreted by a ten-year old as a rather bizarre storylistener. Even where the sender is not present, we per-
about a farm. Most adults are capable of recognising thatceive our own messages, and may alter the content based
the book is an anti-communist allegory. This means that,on our perceptions. As I edited this paper, I spotted the
to some extent, meaning exists within the participants tooccasional spfelling mistoike, and corrected it accord-
communication. 114 Richard Moon has recognised this iningly. As communication is a transactional process, not
analysing freedom of expression, pointing out that themerely a discrete act on the sender’s part, both sender
‘‘activities of speaking and listening are interdependent;and receiver influence the content of communication.
they are part of a process and a relationship. The interestsCommunication theory predicts what our analysis of
of the speaker and listener are realized in the jointanonymity has revealed — that both speakers and lis-
activity of creating meaning.’’ 115teners have an impact upon the meaning of expression.
Something that I have not included in the modelThe model of communication theory recognises
being discussed here, but which is included in manythat communication is distorted by ‘‘noise.’’ The concept
models provided by communication theorists, is thatof noise was first introduced by Claude E. Shannon and
communication has, and is intended to have, some effectWarren Weaver in The Mathematical Theory of Com-
on the destination of the message. 116 When you issue anmunication. 111 ‘‘Noise,’’ which is also described as ‘‘inter-
order to a dog, for example, telling it to ‘‘sit’’, the com-ference’’ by some communication theorists, refers to any-
munication hopefully has the effect of making the dogthing that interferes with the communication process.
sit down.Noise can affect any stage of the communication process,
From the above discussion, we can see why commu-including encoding, transmission or decoding. The sim-
nication is thought of by communications theorists as aplest example of noise is physical noise that interferes
process, rather than a singular, discrete event in time. 117with the transmission of a message, such as static on the
Although the model separates sources from destinations,telephone. Noise is not limited to physical noise, how-
encoding from decoding, the model recognises that eachever. In a courtroom, noise might be the sight of a prose-
of these components of communication are linked.cutor walking around with his or her fly undone. A juror
‘‘Objects which we separate may not always be separable,might be so distracted by this that the juror doesn’t hear
and they never operate independently — each affectsanything the lawyer says.
and interacts with the others.’’ 118Noise also refers to interference with encoding or
Now that we have examined an alternative modeldecoding, which may occur when the source and desti-
of expression, we should compare this with the Supremenation do not share fields of experience. 112 If a person
Court’s model of expression, and criticise that model.writes ‘‘insert the USB cable into the USB port,’’ noise
occurs when the destination has no idea what a USB
cable or port is. Encoding and decoding can also be
distorted by the noise of biases, perceptions and stereo- Criticising the Supreme Court’s
types. As an example of how perception can affect com- Model of Expression munication, in some Canadian First Nations cultures, it
is a sign of respect for an inferior (in age, education, or he similarities between the Supreme Court’s modelTexperience) not to look a superior in the eye while com- of expression and the model provided by commu-
municating. An inferior should keep making eye contact, nication theory can be summarised as follows. The foun-
as this demonstrates that the inferior is listening to what dation of expression and communication is generally the
the superior is saying, but eye contact should be brief, same: conveying a message. In the model of expression,
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veyed through a medium. In communications theory, Figure 2: A Diagram of the Supreme Court’s
the ‘‘form’’ is the process of encoding the message into Model of Expression at the Section 2(b) Stage of
symbols, and the message is also conveyed through a Analysis
medium (or channel). The model of expression
recognises that both speaking and listening are compo-
nents of free expression, while communication theory
suggests that communication is a transactional process,
involving both sources and receivers. To this extent, the
models are largely the same, simply using different ter-
minology. One difference, however, is that the model of
expression includes expression that is not intended to be
communicated. 119
The reason why the model of expression resembles
a model of communication is explained by the rationales
underlying section 2(b). In R v. Keegstra, 120 McLachlin J.
(as she then was) identified three generally accepted justi-
As we can see, this hardly deserves to be called afications for free expression. The first was the political
model at all. It is only during section 1 that the Courtprocess rationale: that free expression is ‘‘instrumental in
considers all aspects of expression, taking into accountpromoting the free flow of ideas essential to political
the interests of both speakers and listeners. Only thendemocracy and the functioning of democratic institu-
does the model of expression come close to resemblingtions.’’ 121 The second was that freedom of expression is
the model of communication, and it could be presented‘‘an essential precondition of the search for truth. . . .
in diagrammatic form as follows:Freedom of expression is seen as a means of promoting a
‘marketplace of ideas,’ in which competing ideas vie for
supremacy to the end of attaining the truth.’’ 122 The Figure 3: Diagram of the Supreme Court’s Model
third rationale was that ‘‘free expression is an end in itself of Expression at the Section 1 Stage
. . . All persons have the right to form their own beliefs
and opinions, and to express them [for] expression is an
integral part of the development of ideas, of mental
exploration and of the affirmation of the self’’ [internal
quotes omitted]. 123 The model of expression resembles
the model of communication because the first two ratio-
nales can generally only be realised if communication
occurs.
The key differences between the models are that the
Supreme Court’s model regards expression as a discrete
event, whereas communication theory sees communica- We can see that the model at the section 1 stage
tion as a process. The court does not recognise the links seems to be an impoverished version of the model pro-
between listeners and speakers at the section 2(b) stage of vided by communication theory. If the communication
analysis. 124 Nor does the model consider the links theory model were applied at the section 2(b) stage, this
between actors and components, and the relationship would require a different approach to the questions of
between components at this stage. The Supreme Court scope and violation. Communication theory views com-
focuses only on one aspect of expression, the interests of munication as a process, which means that you need to
the rights-claimant, to the exclusion of all others. As an look at the relationships between speaker and listener,
example, in cases involving freedom of the press to and the processes of encoding and decoding, to deter-
report on court cases, the court focuses solely on the mine what happens during communication. We cannot
interests of the rights claimant (the media), at the sec- analyse communication merely by focusing on one
tion 2(b) stage of analysis. The privacy rights of witnesses aspect, such as the listener. Hence, if this model was
are only considered during the section 1 stage of analysis. used, we would have to consider all the aspects of expres-
The same is true in all cases involving content-based sion, and the impact on the listener, before determining
limitations on expression. 125 As a result, the model looks whether the expression in issue fell within the scope of






























































this difference suggest that the Supreme Court’s model interacted in this online environment because you could
of expression is flawed? I believe that it does. not face leaving your apartment.
The first problem is that a failure to consider the In this example, Bungle’s acts constituted a form of
relationship between speakers and listeners at the sec- non-violent expression, but they completely undermined
tion 2(b) stage opens the way to ruling that an expressive the victims’ expressive activities. By taking over the char-
activity falls within the scope of section 2(b) even when acters controlled by other users, Bungle eliminated those
the net effect of that activity is to undermine expression. users’ abilities to express themselves. If the MUD had
Richard Moon argues that free expression is really been operated by a governmental body, the decision to
intended to protect communication, and that communi- remove Bungle from the game would have engaged the
cation is a process, with meaning being created by both Charter. You may think that such a scenario is far
speakers and listeners. He states that some forms of fetched, but in fact, governments have created online
expression, such as deceit, intimidation, or manipulation environments that allow users to interact, and contain
involve ‘‘a significant abuse of the communicative rela- mechanisms to expel undesirable users. 129 The current
tionship.’’ He points out that such harm tends to be approach to section 2(b) of the Charter suggests that the
analysed under section 1, despite the fact that it seriously only person’s interests that could be considered under
undermines the relationship of communication. 126 I do section 2(b) would be those of the rights-claimant (in this
not want to debate whether freedom of expression is example, Bungle). But this approach would result in
intended to protect communication. However, I do want Bungle’s activities falling within the scope of section 2(b),
to expand upon Moon’s point that one person’s expres- even though his activities undermined the freedom of
sion can harm another person: Not only can one expression interests of his victims. If Bungle only used
person’s expression harm another (a racial insult, for the MUD rarely, but his victims used it frequently, and
example), one person’s expressive activity can harm they all stopped using the MUD because of the attacks,
another person’s expressive activity. To demonstrate this, the net effect of Bungle’s activity would be to reduce
the next paragraph summarises a real life example expressive activity. Despite this, the current approach
described by Julian Dibbell in his article ‘‘A Rape in taken by the Supreme Court would require that Bungle’s
Cyberspace.’’ 127 expression fall within the scope of section 2(b), because it
fails to take into account the interests of both listenersOn the Internet, some people interact through
and speakers at the scope stage of analysis.online environments called MUDs (multi-user dimen-
sions). A MUD is essentially an online world with many By focusing only on the interests of the rights-
different parts, each of which is called a room. Internet claimant at the section 2(b) stage, the court ignores the
users can create a character whom they maneuver effect of noise on the production of expression. In com-
through this environment by moving between rooms. munication theory, understanding noise, and how to
Users type a message into the computer, which can be reduce noise, is essential to understanding how to suc-
read by all users who are in the same room. This is a cessfully communicate. The court has recognised that
form of pseudonymous interaction. Individuals may do noise exists, in recognising that hate-propaganda can
this for fun, or to meet people without having to deal influence the views of society’s members. 130 Hate-speech
with the pressures and unconscious stereotypes raised in creates biases, and in communication theory, biases are a
a face-to-face meeting. In one of these MUDs, a user form of noise. Despite this, the effect of noise is only
controlled a character named ‘‘Mr. Bungle’’ (I will refer to considered relevant during a section 1 analysis, because
the user as Bungle, and will assume that he was male). this is the only stage at which the biases created by hate
Bungle sexually abused other characters against their speech can be considered. 131 While this may be justifi-
users’ wills. He did this by using a computer program able in the context of hate-speech, it may not be appro-
which gave him the ability to write messages and attri- priate in other contexts.
bute them to another character. For example, Bungle
might write ‘‘Go away’’, and it would appear on a com- The nature, costs, and benefits of anonymity
puter screen under the name of another character. The demonstrate that anonymity impacts expression in a
attacks (that is, the messages that Bungle wrote), were number of different ways. The double-edged nature of
particularly unpleasant. In one, Bungle forced a female anonymity means that anonymity can either harm or
character to ‘‘[jab] a steak knife up her ass, causing help expression. If the courts follow Keegstra, and only
immense joy.’’ While you might say ‘‘so what, it’s only a consider the detrimental aspects of anonymity under
game, and these are only words,’’ these online events had section 1 of the Charter, this could lead to a situation
a real-world impact. One of the victims of this attack where anonymity undermines expression, but must still
later wrote some fairly vituperative comments about be protected under section 2(b). This suggests that the
Bungle, and while writing this, ‘‘post-traumatic tears adverse aspects of anonymity should be considered at
were streaming down her face’’. The other users eventu- the section 2(b) stage, to determine whether it has an
ally removed Bungle from the environment. 128 If you feel adverse effect on free expression, and how serious this
that maybe the victim in this case was overreacting, you adverse effect is. If anonymity merely influences, but
should remember that words can have a physical impact. does not significantly harm the expressive activity, we
Think about how a member of an ethnic minority might not be too concerned, but if the noise caused by
might react to racial remarks. Imagine how you would anonymity is so severe that it makes it impossible to
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allow that aspect of anonymity to fall within the scope of 8:00 p.m. or 8:30 p.m. has no impact on the play’s
section 2(b). As an example of how this might occur, meaning. However, in some cases, as communication
some expression is statutorily barred from being anony- theory predicts, you cannot separate the content and
mous. Ontario legislation requires that testamentary non-content aspects of expression. When this occurs, it
instruments be witnessed by two people, and that the becomes unclear which method of analysis should be
witnesses subscribe to the will. 132 This is done for two applied. 135 The strength of the link between the content
reasons. First, so that at probate, the court can be sure and non-content aspects of expression varies from case to
that the testator was not coerced into signing the will, case, and ostensibly non-content aspects can actually be
and that the person signing the will was the testator. the message to be conveyed. As an example, time is a key
Second, so that the parties involved can contact those aspect of the two minutes of silence which occurs at
witnesses in the event of concern regarding issues such as 11:00 a.m. on Remembrance Day (the same hour that
testamentary capacity. This legislation prevents wills the First World War ended). On Remembrance Day,
from being made anonymously, or from being witnessed time is content, as it is a key part of the message to be
anonymously, but it would be absurd to suggest that this conveyed.
limits expression. The identity of the testator must be In summary, the model provided by communica-
known to give effect to the testator’s act of expression in tion theory suggests the Supreme Court’s model suffers
making the will. If you don’t know the testator’s identity, from the following flaws: It fails to consider the links
the will is useless. Knowing who the witnesses are is vital between listeners and speakers at the section 2(b) stage of
if the will is challenged. If either the testator or witnesses analysis, with the result that a rights-claimant’s expressive
were allowed to be anonymous, this would create noise activity will fall within the scope of section 2(b), even
by preventing listeners (those reading the will), from when this activity undermines the expressive interests of
assessing the source, completely undermining the expres- others; it requires noise to be considered under section 1,
sion involved. Accordingly, noise, and the detrimental even if noise undermines expression; it requires us to
effects that anonymity has on expression, must be con- divorce the content of expression from the components
sidered at the scope stage of section 2(b) analysis. This of expression, which is difficult when the components of
does not mean that all detrimental effects of anonymity expression are inextricably interlinked with the content;
should be considered at the scope stage of analysis. For and it means the method of analysis is not clear when
example, where a witness is anonymous, this may the content and components of expression are inter-
adversely impact an accused person’s fair trial rights. The linked. Having considered these difficulties, we should
detrimental effect here is relevant not to expression, but now go on to consider whether the current framework
to another Charter right, so there is no reason to con- can accommodate anonymity.
sider this at the s. 2(b) stage. It could better be considered
under section 1.
Although most case law suggests that noise and the The Current Framework is Unablerelationship between speaker and listener should be
To Accommodate Anonymity ignored at the section 2(b) stage, this limitation is not
absolute. Violence has been excluded from the scope of
he Supreme Court has recognised different compo-section 2(b). At first glance, this exclusion seems to lack a T nents of expression as they have arisen, and there istheoretical foundation, and cannot be reconciled with
no reason why the model of expression should preventthe refusal to exclude other socially harmful forms of
anonymity from being similarly recognised.expression. 133 However, the violence exception can be
justified if the relationship between listeners and If the traditional Irwin Toy analysis is applied, ano-
speakers is relevant to the scope of section 2(b). An act of nymity will be thought of as a non-content aspect of
violence may express the actor’s feelings, but also repre- expression. Non-content aspects of expression (form,
sents a denial of the listener’s interests. 134 If the relation- forum, time, medium and language), all share one char-
ship between the listener and speaker was never relevant acteristic: Ordinarily, they have no meaning unless
at the section 2(b) stage of analysis, there is no theoretical attached to some message to be conveyed. The same can
justification for excluding violence. be said for anonymity, which cannot exist in the abstract.
Anonymity can be tenuously linked to expression, andThe Supreme Court requires us to analyse content
in many cases, will not be central to what the speakerand non-content aspects of expression differently. Com-
wishes to say. Accordingly, we should examine ano-munication theory suggests this is flawed. Communica-
nymity as if it were a non-content aspect of expression.tion theory views communication as a process, in which
all the components of communication interact to pro- The only case law that specifically examines how a
duce meaning. Sources cannot be separated from desti- non-content aspect of expression should be analysed are
nations or the other aspects of communication, such as the public forum cases. We should look to this case law
encoding, decoding, medium and noise. However, this for guidance, and attempt to extract the basic principles
view is not always accurate. In some cases, the non- that will likely be applied to anonymity. Can anonymity
content aspects of expression have little or no impact on be accommodated by the two-step Ramsden approach,
the message to be conveyed. As an example, time is a and the three Commonwealth approaches? I will argue
non-content aspect of expression, and is usually tenu- that the Ramsden approach will have to be modified if it






























































Commonwealth approaches could be successfully approaches also have the effect of violating the principle
adopted. o f  c o n t e n t -
neutrality. Their decisions indicate that the scope of sec-If the two-step Ramsden approach was applied to
tion 2(b) does not include all non-content aspects ofanonymity without alteration, it would read as follows:
expression. This means that the scope of section 2(b) can(1) Does the activity constitute expression? (2) If so, is the
be limited by reference to the non-content aspect. Theanonymous expressive activity protected by section 2(b)?
principle of content-neutrality requires the content ofThe first question poses no difficulties. If anonymity is
expression to be irrelevant at the scope stage. Thus, con-not linked to an expressive activity, expression is not
tent-neutrality suggests that when dealing with anony-involved, so anonymity could not be protected by sec-
mous expression, a limitation on the scope of sec-tion 2(b). 136 The difficulty lies in applying the second
tion 2(b) should be based solely on the anonymous (non-Ramsden question, which asks whether the activity as a
content), aspect of the expression. Unfortunately, anwhole should be protected under section 2(b), but does
ostensibly non-content limitation on anonymous expres-not separately consider the content and non-content
sion will be a content-based limitation when the anony-aspects. This has the effect of conflating the issues of
mous aspect of expression is so closely linked to thewhether the content should be protected with whether
message that anonymity becomes part of the message.the non-content aspect of expression should be pro-
tected. The question does not ask whether ‘‘anonymity’’ Lamer C.J.’s approach is specific to forum and it is
falls within the scope of section 2(b), but whether the difficult to see how this approach could be applied to
‘‘anonymous-expressive-activity ’’ is protected. This anonymity. His approach can be additionally criticised
ignores the strength of the link between anonymity and on the basis that it is only content-neutral when the
content. The strength of this link exists on a continuum. forum and the content of expression are clearly sepa-
At the weak-link end of the continuum, anonymity is rable. The use of a particular forum may be integral to an
irrelevant to the content, is distinguishable from the expressive activity. Imagine, for example, a play that is
expression, and has no impact on whether the expres- written and designed to be performed in a particular
sion occurs. Anonymity may even harm expression. At public place, such as by the Tomb of the Unknown
the strong-link end, anonymity may be so closely related Soldier in Ottawa. The playwright may have written the
to the content of a message that the anonymity becomes play using imagery that requires the presence of the war
part of the content. 137 If anonymity harms expression, or memorial for the imagery to be understood. In such a
is so weakly linked to the content that it has no impact circumstance, the forum is integral to the expressive
on the expression, there is no reason why the anony- activity, and separating questions of forum and content is
mous aspect should fall within the scope of section 2(b). impossible. Lamer C.J.’s approach categorises certain
However, if the anonymous aspect has no impact on the forums as unavailable for free expression, which elimi-
expression, the answer to the second Ramsden question, nates the need to consider on a case-by-case basis
as it is currently phrased, must always be that anonymity whether the forum is integrally linked to the expression.
should be protected. This is because the underlying If this approach were applied to anonymity, this would
activity is expressive, so the ‘‘anonymous-expressive- violate the principle of content-neutrality whenever ano-
activity’’ must also be expressive. But why should ano- nymity is content. For these reasons, Lamer CJ.’s
nymity receive constitutional protection under sec- approach could not and should not be adapted to
tion 2(b), if it has no impact upon whether expression accommodate anonymity.
occurs? I do not suggest by this that the underlying McLachlin J.’s approach requires a consideration ofexpression should not be protected, but there is no the expression’s value at the scope stage of section 2(b),reason for the anonymous aspect to be protected in such which expressly violates the principle of content-neu-a case. A failure to consider the strength of the link could trality. This approach requires the court to make a valuegive constitutional protection to anonymity when doing judgment about the expression, making a judge’s percep-so is completely unnecessary. tion of the expression relevant to constitutional protec-
The two-step Ramsden approach will also not work tion. This approach is entirely inconsistent with previous
when anonymity and the underlying expression are so decisions that held that all expression, no matter how
strongly linked that anonymity is part of the content. repugnant, should fall within the scope of section 2(b). 138
Where anonymity is content, the anonymous aspect is McLachlin J. feels that some forms of expression, such as
itself expressive. Irwin Toy holds that all expression, no a demonstration within the Supreme Court Chamber,
matter how repulsive, falls within the scope of sec- would not fall within the scope of section 2(b). It is
tion 2(b), which means that a two-step approach would unclear how her test could be objectively applied to take
be unnecessary. All this suggests that the two-step such an activity out of the scope of s. 2(b). 139 Why would
Ramsden approach cannot be applied to anonymity a demonstration in the Supreme Court chamber not
without modification. promote one of the values underlying section 2(b), if a
Anonymity cannot be accommodated under any of similar demonstration in an airport would? What this
the Commonwealth approaches, as they all suffer from approach really does is replace an objective analysis of
the same flaw. All the approaches, if applied to ano- the activity under section 2(b) with a subjective opinion
nymity, fail to consider the strength and importance of about whether a particular place is appropriate for free
the link between anonymity and content in the sec- expression. If Justice McLachlin’s approach were applied





























































182 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
within the scope of section 2(b) if it promoted one of the An Analytical Framework For
values underlying section 2(b). As anonymity can be con- Anonymity tent, this would directly violate the principle of content-
neutrality. Her approach could also protect an anony- hen analysing anonymity under section 2(b),
mous aspect of expression when that aspect actually W there is no reason to depart from the general
harmed the expressive activity. We have seen that the Irwin Toy framework, which is as follows: The first ques-
anonymous aspect of an expressive activity can under- tion is whether the activity in issue falls within the scope
mine free expression. Where this occurs, the anonymous of section 2(b). The second question is whether sec-
aspect of expression would still fall within the scope of tion 2(b) is violated. The third question is whether a
section 2(b), provided the expression as a whole pro- violation of section 2(b) can be saved under section 1.
moted a section 2(b) value. For these reasons, McLachlin It is at the scope stage of section 2(b) that the caseJ.’s approach should not be adopted to deal with ano- law is least clear. The approach to scope should respectnymity. content-neutrality, though the scope can be narrowed to
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s approach in Commonwealth exclude some aspects of anonymity. The two-step
upholds the principle of content-neutrality, but if it were Ramsden approach suggests that the first question must
applied without modification to anonymity, it could be: Is the underlying activity expressive? Anonymity only
attack free expression. If her approach were used, an exists as an aspect of an underlying activity, but not all
anonymous activity will always fall within the scope of activities are expressive. A particular use of anonymity
section 2(b) provided the activity is expressive. Unfortu- should not be protected by section 2(b) if it is related to a
nately, anonymity can undermine expressive activity, in non-expressive activity.
which case protecting it under section 2(b) would harm
The Ramsden two-step approach indicates that afree expression. Another difficulty with adopting
non-content aspect of expression will not fall within theL’Heureux-Dubé J.’s approach is that it was rejected by
scope of section 2(b) merely because it is related to anthe majority of judges in Commonwealth.
expressive act. More is required. The nature, costs, andIn dealing with the scope stage of the analytical
benefits of anonymity suggest that anonymity can under-framework, the problems with each of the Common-
mine free expression. Where this occurs, it would bewealth approaches suggest that none of them should be
illogical to hold that anonymity falls within the scope ofadopted for anonymity. None of the approaches are
section 2(b). The decisions of Lamer C.J. and McLachlinbinding because none represents a majority opinion.
J. in Commonwealth allow the exclusion of some aspectsHaving said this, three principles emerge from the case
of anonymity from the scope of section 2(b). This can belaw which, as they are supported by a majority of judges,
done in a content-neutral fashion, which does notare likely to be adopted in dealing with anonymity. The
undermine free expression, by holding that anonymityfirst principle is content-neutrality, which was adopted in
will only fall within the scope of section 2(b) if it pro-Irwin Toy, and has only been deliberately attacked by
motes, allows, or has some beneficial impact upon anMcLachlin J. in Commonwealth. The second principle,
expressive activity.found in Ramsden, is that a two-step approach should be
used to determine whether a non-content aspect of As an example of how this approach would apply,
expression falls within the scope of section 2(b). The first the Internet has been used by murderers to find their
step focuses on whether the underlying activity is expres- victims. Such individuals are able to evade the police,
sive, and the second step takes into account the non- and potentially commit additional crimes, because of the
content aspect. The third principle is that while sec- difficulties involved in tracking someone through the
tion 2(b) protects all content of expression, no matter Internet. Such individuals use anonymity to commit
how repulsive, non-content aspects of expression can fall crimes. Let us assume the Criminal Code is amended,
outside the scope of section 2(b). This principle can be allowing the police to apply ex parte for a warrant
extracted from the violence exception, and from the requiring an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to disclose
judgments of Lamer C.J. and McLachlin J. in Common- the identity of a user. Let us assume further that such a
wealth. This means that future courts will be permitted warrant can only be issued if: (1) The police are investi-
to exclude anonymity from the scope of section 2(b) in gating a serious violent offence, and (2) the police can
some circumstances. In dealing with the violation of sec- establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the
tion 2(b), the general Irwin Toy approach has never been user committed the violent offence. Such a scheme
overruled or challenged, which means it will likely be limits anonymity, because it allows the police to break
followed in dealing with anonymity. Now that we have the cloak of anonymity by obtaining the warrant, and
established the principles that apply in analysing a non- the anonymous activity involves expression. Despite this,
content aspect of expression, we are ready to consider the legislation actually protects Internet users and pro-






























































express themselves freely if they know there are laws the advantage of being content-neutral. It modifies, but
designed to protect them from violent Internet does not reject, the two-step Ramsden approach, and it
predators. As such, this particular aspect of anonymity follows the principle established in Commonwealth —
(the right to anonymous Internet use by a person sus- that the scope of section 2(b) can be narrowed by
pected on reasonable and probable grounds of having excluding some non-content aspects of expression. Most
committed a serious violent offence), would be excluded importantly, it denies protection to anonymity when
from the scope of section 2(b), because it does not pro- anonymity undermines expression. This approach, inci-
mote expression. dentally, could also be applied to the analysis of public
fora and other non-content aspects of expression.In the above example, you will note that in con-
cluding that the anonymous activity does not promote At the violation stage of the section 2(b) analysis,
free expression, I have considered both the interests of Irwin Toy is binding authority and has to be followed by
the listeners (Internet users in general), and the interests future courts when dealing with anonymity. Having said
of the rights-claimant speaker (the person reasonably sus- this, assuming an aspect of anonymity promotes expres-
pected of having committed the violent offence). This sion, this does not mean that a limitation on anonymity
represents a departure from the traditional Irwin Toy will automatically violate section 2(b). Before applying
analysis, as confirmed in Keegstra, in which the interests the Irwin Toy analysis, we must remember that ano-
of society were not considered at the scope stage of nymity exists in various degrees, and in various forms.
section 2(b) analysis. I justify this departure on several Governments have a variety of tools to use in regulating
grounds. First, the Supreme Court has not placed an anonymity, and do not have to choose between perfect
absolute requirement that one consider only the inter- anonymity and no anonymity. Some tools may limit
ests of the rights claimant during section 2(b). This is anonymity to such an extent that the expressive activity
demonstrated by the violence exception, which can only is hindered. Other tools may have no perceptible effect
be justified theoretically if the interests of listeners can be on expressive activity.
taken into account, and by the approach taken by Lamer Under the Irwin Toy analysis, if a limitation is pur-
C.J. and McLachlin J., in Commonwealth, which implic- posefully intended to limit expression by distinguishing
itly considers interests other than those of the rights between acceptable and unacceptable messages, a sec-
claimant. Thus, my suggested analysis has a basis in cur- tion 2(b) violation will occur. If the limitation merely has
rent case law. Second, the Supreme Court’s model of the effect of limiting expression, the Charter claimant
expression is weak at the section 2(b) stage of analysis. As must demonstrate that the expression supports one of
the communication theory model demonstrates, com- the values underlying freedom of expression to establish
munication is a process, rather than a discrete event. a section 2(b) violation. A ban on anonymous messages
Divorcing the speaker’s interests from the listener’s inter- criticising the government would be a limitation on ano-
ests cannot be justified when one person’s expressive nymity that is purposefully aimed at limiting the content
activity undermines another person’s expressive activity. of expression. Such a purposeful limitation would always
Thirdly, anonymity is double-edged. Whether it helps or violate section 2(b). However, legislation requiring ISPs
hinders expression can only be determined on a case-by- to link legal identity and IP addresses on the public
case basis. The nature of anonymity requires that we domain would be a content-neutral limitation on ano-
consider the impact on the free expression rights of both nymity that would have an effect of limiting expression.
listeners and speakers. In such a case, the Charter claimant would have to show
So far, I have only considered the method of analysis that the content of expression supports one or more of
that would be adopted when anonymity is not part of the values underlying section 2(b) before a limitation is
the content. When anonymity is content, a two-step shown. The issues raised by anonymity do not challenge
approach will not work. The only way to respect the this part of the Irwin Toy framework.
principle of content-neutrality is to hold that where ano- Where a limitation is content-neutral, a violation of
nymity is content, it will always fall within the scope of section 2(b) should not be assumed merely because a
section 2(b). The sole exception to this would be if the limitation on anonymity exists. This is because even if
impact of the anonymous-expressive activity on anonymity does promote the expressive activity, a limita-
another’s expressive activity is so severe that the net effect tion on anonymity will not necessarily discourage that
of the anonymous-expressive activity is to undermine activity. When dealing with content-neutral limitations,
expression. An example of how this might occur is pro- the burden lies on the Charter claimant to demonstrate
vided by the situation discussed earlier involving Mr. a violation. This means a claimant would need to
Bungle. As such, the test at the scope stage should vary demonstrate that a limitation on anonymity also limits
depending on how closely the anonymity is linked with the expressive activity, in addition to demonstrating that
expression. the expressive activity promotes one of the section 2(b)
This approach I suggest is summarised as follows. If values. As with the scope stage, the court will have to
the anonymity is content, anonymity automatically falls consider the link between anonymity and content
within the scope of section 2(b). If the anonymous aspect before deciding whether a limitation on anonymity vio-
of an activity is not content, a two-step approach to scope lates section 2(b). As an example, in regulating SLAPP
could be adopted which asks: (1) Is the act expressive? suits, the government could choose to introduce legisla-
and (2) Does the non-content aspect of expression pro- tion that makes it difficult for plaintiffs to force ISPs to
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legal identity to be disclosed in certain circumstances, does not mean that anonymity must be protected in
and as such, would limit anonymity. However, the test every case.
could be so strong that only the most blatant acts of libel The Supreme Court’s model of expression ignoresand slander will result in disclosure. The strength of the the fact that much of communication, and much oftest could actually encourage anonymous users to expression, is a transactional process that involves theexpress themselves freely because they know that their integrated activity of actors (speakers and listeners), andidentities are not likely to be disclosed. As such, the the components of expression. This flaw creates aanonymity falls within the scope of section 2(b), because number of difficulties when analysing expression, partic-it promotes free expression, but the limitation on ano- ularly when one person’s expressive activities will under-nymity does not discourage free expression, and as such mine another’s. The nature of anonymity means that theno section 2(b) violation occurs. Supreme Court’s model must be developed. It is not
possible to analyse anonymity without considering the
impact of anonymity on the interests of both speakersConclusion and listeners. It should not be assumed that anonymity
nonymity may arise in any number of different promotes expression, or that a limitation on anonymityA expressive activities, and the effects of anonymity on harms expression. Anonymity should only fall within the
expression will vary from case to case. Anonymity may scope of section 2(b) when (1) the activity is expressive,
help expression, hinder expression, or have no percep- and (2) the anonymity promotes the expressive activity,
tible effect on expression. Historically, anonymity has or when the anonymous aspect is expressive in and of
been vital to freedom of expression, allowing the pro- itself. A limitation on anonymity should only violate
mulgation of new ideas when the world seeks to silence section 2(b) where the Charter claimant can demon-
the speaker. As a result, anonymity can undoubtedly be strate that the limitation on anonymity also limits the
protected under section 2(b) of the Charter, though this expressive activity.
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90 See supra notes 74-80.Feasby’s detailed and well-reasoned argument on this issue: Jonathan T.
Feasby, ‘‘Who was that masked man? Online defamation, freedom of 91 See R v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 at para. 34.
expression, and the right to speak anonymously’’, (2001) 1 Canadian 92 Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R.Journal of Law and Technology 1. 139 [Commonwealth].51 See the judgment of Wilson J., in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney 93 Ramsden v. Peterborough (City), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084.General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326. 94 Commonwealth, supra note 92.52 This might happen when the parties know each other’s email address, 95 Ramsden, supra note 94.but not each other’s legal identity. One person can send money to the
other using an Internet payment service such as Paypal or Billpoint. The 96 Commonwealth, supra note 92 at 232.
service then bills the sender’s credit card, and pays the recipient directly. 97 McLachlin J.’s view is difficult to understand, and seems to conflate the
The recipient could then send the goods purchased to a P.O. Box. There issues of scope and violation. McLachlin J.’s threshold test is based on
is no need for the sender to know the recipient’s true identity unless the whether the expression promotes one of the values underlying sec-
technology requires it. tion 2(b). She argues that the
53 Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. test for the constitutional right to use government property for
232 at para. 28. public expression should conform to the following criteria. It
54 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), should be based on the values and interests at stake and not be
1982, c. 11, s. 2(b). confined to the characteristics of particular types of government
property. The analysis under section 2(b) should focus on deter-55 Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [Ford].
mining when, as a general proposition, the right to expression on56 Ibid. at 748.
government property arises. The task at this stage should be57 Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [Irwin Toy]. primarily definitional rather than one of balancing, and the test
58 Ibid. at 968. should be sufficiently generous to ensure that valid claims are
not excluded for want of proof. Once it has been determined59 An activity ‘‘is expressive if it attempts to convey meaning. That meaning
that the expression in question at the location in question fallsis its content’’. See Irwin Toy, supra note 57 at 968.
within the scope of s. 2(b) thus defined, the further question60 Irwin Toy, supra note 57 at 969-970.
arises of whether the government’s limitation on the property’s61 Cox v. New Hampshire, (1941) 312 U.S. 569 at 575-576, 85 Law Ed. (US use for the expression in question is justified under s. 1. . . .
311-313) p. 1053-1054. Time was identified in Committee for the Com-
Irwin Toy distinguished between two classes of restrictions onmonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, as an aspect of
freedom of expression: restrictions aimed at preventing certainexpression, without discussion.
meanings being conveyed, and restrictions which are not62 The telephone is a medium of communication: Canada (Human Rights directed at content but have the effect of restricting expression.Commission) v. Taylor [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, [1990] S.C.J. No. 129. . . .63 See Taylor, ibid., Ford, supra note 55 at 750, and Little Sisters Book and . . . [L]imitations on forum may fall into either of the two funda-Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1990] S.C.J. No. 66 at mental categories of restrictions on expression distinguished inpara. 65. Irwin Toy. . . .64 Lawful Access, supra note 8 at 7. . . . The test for whether s. 2(b) applies to protect expression in a65 See infra note 68. particular forum depends on the class into which the restriction
at issue falls. If the government’s purpose is to restrict the content66 See Richard Moon, ‘‘Access to Private Property Under Freedom of Expres-
of expression through limiting the forums in which it can besion’’ (1998) Ottawa L.R. 339.
made, then this, as Cox says, is ‘‘usually impermissible’’. The67 I have assumed that there is a distinction between ‘‘medium’’ and
result, under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is‘‘forum.’’ An argument could doubtless be made that a forum is a
that s. 2(b) applies. If, on the other hand, the restriction ismedium, but as nothing turns on this for the purposes of this paper, I will
content neutral, it may well not infringe freedom of expressionnot consider the issue further here. The jurisprudence dealing with
at all. In this case, the jurisprudence laid down in Irwin Toyforums will be considered in detail later in this essay. See Common-
requires that the claimant establish that the expression in ques-wealth, supra note 61, and Peterborough (City) v. Ramsden, [1993] 2
tion (including its time, place and manner) promote one of theS.C.R. 1084.
purposes underlying the guarantee of free expression [emphasis68 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. New Brunswick (A.G.), [1996] 3 added] (Commonwealth, ibid. note 92 at 236–238.).S.C.R. 480, Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326.
McLachlin’s approach to section 2(b) was unclear. In Commonwealth,69 Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin she discusses whether section 2(b) ‘‘applies,’’ but she does not clarifyDelivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 [Dolphin Delivery]. whether ‘‘applies’’ refers to the scope of section 2(b), or the violation of70 Ford v. A.G. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712. section 2(b). This has the effect of conflating the analysis of scope and
71 Irwin Toy Ltd., supra note 57. violation. ‘‘Though the two will overlap in many cases, the concepts
are separate. ’’ (See Jamie B. Cameron, ‘‘A Bumpy Landing: The72 Irwin Toy, supra note 57 at 968.
Supreme Court of Canada and Access to Public Airports Under Sec-73 Irwin Toy, supra note 57. tion 2(b) of the Charter.’’ (1992) 2 M.C.L.R. 91 at 104.). Her approach74 R v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. was clarified by Iaccobucci J.’s judgment in Ramsden, which was
75 R v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 [Butler]. presented on behalf of the entire court. In Ramsden, Iaccobucci J.
analyses the issues using all three Commonwealth approaches and76 Reference re. ss. 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada, [1990]
reaches the same conclusion under each approach. He explicitly sepa-1 S.C.R. 1123 [Prostitution Reference].
rates his analysis of scope (Ramsden, supra note 93 at 1096–1104), and77 R v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 [Sharpe]. violation (Ramsden, supra note 93 at 1104-1105), and applied78 Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. McLachlin J.’s approach at the scope stage of the section 2(b) analysis.
232. As McLachlin J. concurred in this judgment, this suggests she intends
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opinion, the value of expression is relevant at the scope stage of and Weaver’s theory has been hugely influential, and their model is the
section 2(b). ‘‘This . . . is inconsistent with step one of Irwin Toys’s test, basis for many modern models of communication. See supra note 106.
which  treats any attempt to convey meaning, trivial or not, as prima 112 See Severin and Tankard (1997), supra note 106 at 74–78.
facie protected by section 2(b)’’ (Cameron at 103). 113 See Rupert Ross, Dancing With a Ghost: Exploring Indian Reality, But-98 Ramsden, supra note 93. terworths Canada, 1992, at page 3.
99 Ramsden, supra note 93 at 1095-1096. 114 Schramm, Nature of Communication Between Humans, ibid. note 109
100 R v. Guignard, [2002] S.C.C. 14. at 30.
101 Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285 at 306, cited in Irwin Toy, supra 115 Richard Moon, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression,
note 57 at 969. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 42 [Moon].
102 Irwin Toy, supra note 57 at 968. 116 See Lasswell’s model of communication, described in Severin &
Tankard, supra note 106 at 47.103 John Stuart Mill, ‘‘On Liberty’’ in On Liberty and Considerations on
Representative Government (Oxford: OUP, 1946) at 14, cited in 117 David K. Berlo, The Process of Communication: An Introduction to
Dolphin Delivery, ibid. note 69 at 583. Theory and Practice (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960) at
23–38.104 Irwin Toy, supra note 72.
118 Berlo, ibid. at 117.105 See the judgment of L’Heureux-Dubé in Commonwealth, ibid. note 92
at 183, as well as Michael Kanter, ‘‘Balancing Rights Under Section 2(b) 119 In Sharpe, the Supreme Court held that two categories of self-created
of the Charter: Case Comment on Committee for the Commonwealth works not intended for communication, which could otherwise fall
of Canada v. Canada’’ (1992) 17 Queens L.J. 489 at 498. within the ban on child pornography, were protected: R v. Sharpe, supra
note 77 at para. 128.106 The discussion of communication theory which follows has been taken
from a number of sources. In 1949, Claude E. Shannon and Warren 120 R v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
Weaver developed a general model of communication in The Mathe- 121 Keegstra, ibid. at 802.matical Theory of Communication (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 122 Keegstra, supra note 119 at 803, citing Justice Oliver Wendell Homes in1949). This model, which included an information-source, a transmitter,
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.  616 (1919).a receiver, an information-destination, and recognised the importance of
noise, has been hugely influential. The Shannon and Weaver model has 123 Keegstra, supra note 119 at 804, citing T.I. Emerson, ‘‘Toward a General
been adapted and built upon by a number of communication theorists. Theory of the First Amendment’’, (1963) 72 Yale L.J. 877.
Joseph Schramm, in ‘‘How Communication Works’’ in The Process and 124 Moon, supra note 115 at 41.
Effects of Mass Communication (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 125 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. New Brunswick, [1996] 3 S.C.R.1954), developed three models, which recognised the importance of 480. The Crown, because of the broad scope of section 2(b), routinelyfields of experience, encoding and decoding. The basic model I have concedes that section 2(b) is violated, which eliminates the need todescribed here is not my own, but is taken largely from the Shannon consider any interests beyond those of the rights claimant (see, forand Weaver and Schramm models. Those models are reproduced in example, R v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 at para. 18). That the Court willmany basic texts, which contain a more substantial discussion of the only consider the interests of the rights claimant is also confirmed bymodels of communication than I have engaged in. Examples of such the hate-speech cases, where the court focusses solely on whether hatetexts, which indicate that the model I have used here is generally speech was expressive, and whether it had been limited (Keegstra, supraaccepted as a basic model for how communication occurs, includes: note 120 at 731). The other interests, such as the interests of society inJoseph A Devito, Essentials of Human Communication (New York: ridding itself of hate speech, and the interests of minority groups in notHarper Collins, 1993); Ronald B. Adler and George Rodman, Under- being threatened by hate speech, were considered only during the sec-standing Human Communication, 4th ed., Orlando: Holt, Rinehart, tion 1 analysis (Keegstra, supra note 120 at 747-748).Winston: 1991); Werner J. Severin and James W. Tankard, Jr. Communi- 126 Moon, supra note 115 at 41-42.cation Theories: Origins, Methods and uses in the Mass Media, 4th ed.
(New York: Longman, 1997); Richard F. Hixson, ‘‘Mass Media: An 127 Julian Dibbell, ‘‘A Rape in Cyberspace’’ The Village Voice, December 23,
approach to human communication’’ in Richard W. Budd and Brent D. 1993, reproduced in Julian Dibbell, My Tiny Life (Owl Books, 1998),
Ruben, eds., Approaches to Human Communication (New York: online: Julian Dibbell http://www.juliandibbell.com/texts/bungle.html.
Spartan Books, 1972) at 222–236; Colin Cherry, On Human Communi- 128 Ibid.
cation: A review, a survey and a criticism, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: The 129 The U.S. military has created a multiplayer game, designed to be playedM.I.T. Press, 1966); Larry L. Barker, Communication, 4th ed. (Englewood online, as a recruiting tool: ‘‘ ‘Recon’ version of America’s Army launchesCliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1987); Brent D. Ruben, Communication and July 4’’ (07/02/02), The Dallas Morning News, online: Dallas NewsHuman Behavior, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,1992); Gerald http://www.dallasnews.com/cgi-bin/gold_print.cgi. The game containsStone et. al., Clarifying Communication Theories, (Ames:Iowa State Uni- allows users to vote to expel a user who is not following the rules of theversity Press, 1999 at 26-35); Stewart L. Tubbs and Sylvia Moss, Human game. The Government of Canada also seems to have operated a Web-Communication, 5th ed. (New York: Random House, 1987); Rudolph F. conference (see Health Forum, online: http://healthforum.ic.gc.ca/Verderber, Communicate!, 3rd ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing e_faq.html, last visited February 18, 2003).Company, 1981). Different models for communication have been sug-
130 Keegstra, supra note 120 at 747-748.gested and used, depending on what the theorist wanted to demon-
strate. In one model, it is suggested that communication does not neces- 131 Keegstra, supra note 120 at 731.
sarily begin with a person but with an event. A plane crash occurs, 132 Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. 26, s. 4.
which causes a reporter to report (Severin, 1997, at 60, describing a 133 See Jamie Cameron, ‘‘The Original Conception of Section 1 and itsmodel by Westley and MacLean). I do not propose to discuss all the
Demise: A Comment on Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Attorney General of Quebec’’,models that have been suggested in communication theory, as I am
(1989) 35 McGill L.J. 253 at 268. Thanks go also to Professor John H.interested only in a model that describes how communication actually
Currie, whose comments led me to consider this issue.occurs. For a complete review of other models of communication, the
134 Moon, supra note 115 at 44-46.reader should refer to the above texts, and also to: H.D. Lasswell, ‘‘The
structure and function of communication in society’’ in L. Bryson, ed., 135 For a discussion of this problem in the context of violence, see Cameron,
The Communication of Ideas (New York: Harper & Row, 1948). supra note 132 at 269, and M. David Lepofsky, ‘‘The Supreme Court’s
Approach to Freedom of Expression — Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney107 Colin Cherry, ibid. note 106 at 9.
General) — And the illusion of Section 2(b) Liberalism’’, (1993) 3108 This concept was introduced by Wilbur Schramm, as ‘‘frames of refer-
National Journal of Constitutional Law 37 at 48-52.ence’’, in ‘‘The Nature of Communication Between Humans’’, in
136 I am assuming here that anonymity can never be expressive in and ofWilbur Schramm and Donald F. Roberts, The Process and Effects of
itself. If it could be, it would fall to be dealt with as if it were content,Mass Communication, Rev. Ed., (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
which will be discussed later in this article.1977) at 31 (same as ‘‘How Communication Works’’).
137 On this point, see also Moon, ibid. note 115, at page 45, where he argues109 Wilbur Schramm, ‘‘How Communication Works’’ in Wilbur Schramm,
that ‘‘meaning is inseparable from the form in which it is manifested. AThe Process and Effects of Mass Communication (Urbana: University of
restriction on a particular for of expression must be understood as aIllinois Press, 1949), reproduced in C. David Mortensen, Basic Readings
restriction on meaning, even if the purpose of the restriction is not toin Communication Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) at 35
prevent the communication of a particular message’’.[Schramm].
138 Cameron, ‘‘A Bumpy Landing’’, ibid. note 97 at 103.110 Adler, supra note 106 at 16 and 18 and Devito, supra note 106 at 7.
111 Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of 139 Richard Moon, ‘‘Out of Place: Comment on Committee for the Com-
Communication (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1949). Shannon monwealth of Canada v. Canada’’, (1993) 38 McGill L.J. 204 at 225.
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